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This article explores material from a citizen’s inquiry into the social and ethical 
implications of health biosensors. In ‘Our Bodies, Our Data’ a space was afforded for 
members of the public to examine two forms of health biosensing, and for the authors 
to research what happens when such examination shifts from the domain of experts to 
that of citizens.  Drawing on data from this inquiry, which forms part of a wider 
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research project, ‘Living Data: making sense of health biosensors’, we open up 
conceptual and methodological questions about how to study innovative health 
technologies and contribute to debates about the direction of health biosensing by 
bringing forward the views of a group rarely heard in this domain: the public.   The 
panel of 15 participants was shown examples, handled devices, and heard evidence 
about the development of home ovulation monitoring and direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing. Citizens identified key areas of concern around the development, design and 
marketing of these devices, implicating technology companies, public bodies and 
civil society organisations. The panel articulated serious concerns relating to ethics, 
trust, accountability, quality and governance of health biosensors that operate 
‘outside the clinic’. Their deliberations reflect concern for what kind of society is 
being made when genetic testing and home reproductive technologies are promoted 
and sold directly to the public. The panel process allowed us to re-imagine 
biosensors, wresting their narratives from the individualising discourses of self-
optimisation and responsibilisation which have dominated their introduction in Euro-
US markets. 
 




Monitoring one’s physiological state through the collection of personal bodily data - 
heart rate, temperature, sleep cycles, calories consumed, steps walked – is an 
increasingly important element of many people’s attempts to achieve health and 
avoid risks of illness and medical intervention (Lupton, 2015). Self-monitoring 
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promises to reduce and manage risk, but does it also produce new risks for 
individuals and for society?  
 
Devices used in personal health monitoring practices are often referred to as 
‘biosensors’ (Nafus 2013). This contemporary term blends two entities: devices and 
biologically active agents (OED 2007): implied in ‘device’ is the idea of collection, 
recording and storing or ‘data-fying’ what is being sensed from the bio (in the cases 
we describe here, saliva). Adding this process of data-fying to the commercial, 
‘direct-to-consumer’ context of biosensing devices and practices, raises serious 
political, ethical and social concerns. Most research in this field, however, studies 
‘users’ of self-tracking technologies and/or focuses on the technologies as ‘kit’. 
Focusing on two key areas of health risk - in/fertility and dementia - in this article, 
we, in contrast, explore what citizens have to say about the risks and promises of 
biosensing.  
 
'Lay' interpretation of risk and biosensors 
   
 Biosensors are iconic examples of the contemporary materialisation of risk. Building 
on the growing body of ethnographically informed work on information-based 
enhancement and augmentation of the body (such as Viseu and Suchman 2012) in 
this article we add a public perspective on the development, use and implications of 
health monitoring devices ‘outside the clinic’. The citizens’ views reported here give 
an empirical perspective to sociological critiques of risk and rationality, articulating 
ways in which the decisions of so-called ‘consumers’ of health biosensors are deeply 
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embedded in complex lived realities of ontological insecurity and erosion of trust in 
professional and expert knowledges and services. 
 
The ethnographically-informed scenario used in our citizen’s panel discussions 
(which we discuss more fully in the methods section) articulate two main forms of 
health risk: knowing one’s future risk of dementia (driven in this case by anxiety and 
family circumstances); and warding off the risk of infertility and the physically and 
emotionally challenging medical interventions now commonly associated with it. The 
characters in our scenario engaging with these forms of medicalising risk have a 
sense of themselves as about to become pathologised and of needing to consider and 
address their health futures.  
 
Managing future health risk through attention and action in the present is a strong 
theme in contemporary health discourses and is documented in studies of genetic 
testing, heart disease, fertility and HIV/AIDS. Much of this research, however, shows 
that in contrast to expert, statistical discourses, ‘lay’ people interpret future health 
risks in relational terms: thinking about family, personal connections and the 
authenticity of the source of knowledge. Franklin and Roberts (2004), for example, 
show that couples at high risk of passing on serious genetic disease consider multiple 
factors  (personal, familial and societal) in their decision-making about how to 
manage the risks of having a(nother) child with the condition. Similarly, in a study of 
ovarian cancer, Hallowell suggests that: 
 
[R]isk awareness is, at least in part, dependent upon the recognition of 
suffering in oneself and others, while managing risk is, among other things, 
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an attempt to avoid suffering in the future for oneself and other family 
members. (Hallowell 2006 p 23) 
 
In relation to the management of risk associated with the introduction of remote 
(sensor based) home care monitoring for older people, or ‘telecare’, it has been noted 
that there is also a shift in sociotechnical networks of relations (Mort et al 2013). 
Although engaging with scientific and biomedical information, this relational 
thinking often at least partially distances itself from expert views. Brown and 
Michael (2002), for example, describe a shift from authority to authenticity in their 
analysis of publics’ assessment of the risks associated with xenotransplantation (the 
transplantation of living cells, tissues or organs from one species to another). Cox and 
McKellin (1999) describe a gap between patients’ and clinicians’ views of who 
counts as ‘family’ when considering genetic risk of Huntington’s Disease. 
Biomedical knowledge is central to the production of new forms of risk, but does not 
determine individual’s responses to these (Novas and Rose, 2000). 
 
Our ethnographic studies show that biosensors are framed by manufacturers and 
consumers as ways to contain and manage risk but also that users almost always find 
that the biological data provided open up complex health-related questions that 
experts are unable or unwilling to answer (Kragh-Furbo et al, 2016; Wilkinson et al, 
2015). Using biosensors in our two research areas – personalised genetic testing and 
fertility monitoring – then, often leads to participation in online forums in which 
users collectively attempt to parse the meaning of data and, importantly, to decide 
what to do to manage their individual risks.  
 
6 
‘Lay’ people’s focus on relationality when considering risk, in our view, indicates a 
keen awareness of the broader social, political and ethical implications of biomedical 
risk categories, assessments and related practices. Following users, consumers or 
patients through their engagement with risk discourses and associated biomedical and 
other technologies (such as online forums), and asking them to articulate their 
thoughts and actions in interviews and focus groups, allows researchers to begin to 
see what these extra-medical considerations might be. But what might we find if we 
ask a broader population of respondents to tell us what they think about biosensors 
and their implications for health, risk and society? 
   
Two types of Biosensors 
Our research addresses two increasingly important areas of biosensing: personalised 
genetic testing and fertility monitoring. As detailed below, we focus on widely 
available, relatively affordable biosensors designed and marketed to assist consumers 
to assess and manage health risks outside of public or private clinical regimes. 
 
Genetic testing In December 2014 23andMe, a commercial company based in the 
USA, launched its direct-to-consumer testing kits in the UK and subsequently the 
£125 Saliva Collection Kit and Personal Genome Service went on sale online and 
over-the-counter at Superdrug stores. After spitting into the tube that comes with the 
kit, customers send their samples to 23andMe’s contracted laboratory in California 
that processes the samples using microarray technologies, and within a few weeks, 
their testing results are ready to view via email. Heavily criticised by the Royal 
College of General Practitioners, the Personal Genome Service provides data that 
claim to show users how their genetic profile may impact their health and how their 
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family history may be implicated in possible future health conditions (The Guardian 
2014a; 2014b). These claims are regarded by many experts as highly dubious. Hardy 
and Singleton (2009), for example, argue in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
results are based on data from genome-wide association studies for common, 
complex conditions that involve multiple genes with relatively common genetic 
variants that each confers a modest to small effect on disease risk  
 
Reacting to the over-the-counter availability of the tests, the Royal College of 
General Practitioners chair Maureen Baker said their availability could cause 
unnecessary worry and anxiety, put extra pressure on doctors, and that considering a 
genetic family history: 
 
  is a key skill that is best left to medical professionals, who can also provide 
 the necessary support and advice to patients in a private and confidential  
 environment’ (Baker cited in the The Guardian 2015).  
 
While 23andMe does not provide counseling as part of its service, the company 
encourages its customers to contact a health care professional, and in effect, as Fiore-
Gartland and Neff  note, the interpretative work is brought back into the medical 
system. 23andMe might cut out ‘a middleman while integrating seamlessly all the 
parts of the middleman’s very system’ (Gartland and Neff, forthcoming). Thus, while 
the company attempts to disrupt traditional medicine through a so-called 
‘democratisation of access to information’, the disruption discourses ignore, Fiore-
Gartland and Neff argue, the issue of interpretation; data generated by the tests 
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require mediation: forms of interpretative work done by individuals themselves or by 
medical professionals.  
 
23andMe’s UK launch was controversial, sparking much comment in the news media 
and from the public, since 23andMe had previously been banned from marketing its 
Personal Genome Service in the US by the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) 
which regulates products intended to diagnose, mitigate, treat or prevent disease, over 
concerns about the ‘public health consequences of inaccurate results from the PGS 
[Personal Genome Service] service’ (FDA 2013; Guardian 2013). In the letter to 
23andMe, FDA had expressed concern about the company’s failure to demonstrate 
that its service has been analytically and clinically validated, and noted how 
23andMe had suddenly stopped communication with the Administration in May 2013 
after four years of interaction. Later that year, 23andMe launched an aggressive 
national television, radio and online advertising campaign that is said to have piqued 
the FDA’s interest (WSJ 2013). 23andMe has since worked with the FDA to get its 
tests analytically and clinically validated for their intended uses, and in October 2015, 
the company relaunched its Personal Genome Service on the US market with health 
risk reports that meet the FDA standards.  
 
Fears have also been raised about the misuse of confidential data; 23andMe (which 
has Google as a major investor) has declared it does not share the individual-level 
genetic data with insurance companies or any other interested party without a user’s 
explicit consent, unless required by law. However, the company may share a person’s 
anonymised and aggregated data with third parties that include its business partners 
(23andMe 2015). While this type of data has been stripped of personal information, it 
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has been demonstrated that ‘it is possible, in principle, to identify an individual’s 
genomic data within a large dataset of pooled genomic data’ (Vorhaus 2009). This 
also raises questions about data security. While 23andMe uses ‘robust authentication 
methods to access its database’, the company also acknowledges that ‘it is never 
possible to fully guarantee against breaches in security’ (23andMe 2015).   
 
Users of 23andMe are also invited to participate in the company’s research. If they 
consent to 23andMe Research, their individual-level data may be shared with third 
parties such as pharmaceutical companies and 23andMe may ‘create, commercialize, 
and apply this new knowledge to improve health care’ (23andMe 2015). It did this in 
2012, when the company announced its first patent – related to its Parkinson’s 
Disease research – that came as a surprise to many of its customers, and while 
23andMe ‘aim[s] for these discoveries to benefit everyone’ (23andMe 2012), it is 
unclear who will benefit the most. In their study of 23andMe’s research practice, 
Harris, Wyatt and Kelly (2012) argued that while 23andMe represents research 
participation as a form of gift exchange, this framing is used to draw attention away 
from the free, clinical labour that drives the profitability of 23andMe.   
 
Wyatt et al. (2013) analysed the performative dimensions of trust relations between 
23andMe and its users, drawing on Shapin and Schaffer’s (1985) discussion of 
material, literary and social technologies. They are sceptical of the ways in which 
23andMe tries to build trust with its users, for example by use of personal language 
(use of ‘you’), promotion of links to the National Institute of Health, providing 
profiles of its advisory board with details of their university affiliations, the use of 
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firewalls, secure online payment systems, encryption of data, lab certifications and 
others.  
 
Home reproductive technology Whilst there has been less visible controversy 
surrounding home reproductive technologies, some of these devices do involve the 
collection and storage of large amounts of personal biological data with the attendant 
concerns about accountability and potential commercial use. In this article we 
consider how having data about ovulation cross cuts into medical protocols around 
the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.   
 
Companies promise that home ovulation monitoring devices will increase the chances 
of becoming pregnant and reduce the need for invasive medicine (testing and 
intervention). The Clearblue Fertility Monitor for example, in which urine tests are 
made to detect changes in hormones, claims to increase the chances of becoming 
pregnant by 89%. Ovulation microscopes offer saliva-based fertility testing as a way 
of detecting the surge in oestrogen which occurs before ovulation. If oestrogen is 
present in saliva, then crystallised ferning patterns will appear on the slide. Other 
monitors include Ovusense, a vaginal sensor which continuously records a woman’s 
temperature while sleeping, and DuoFertility, also a temperature monitoring sensor 
worn under the arm. With DuoFertility, users receive a hand-held reader to record 
additional fertility information such as ovulation pain, sexual intercourse or cervical 
mucous.  A little-known device, the OV-Watch, is a watch-like sensor that records 
changes in hormone levels found in skin perspiration. In addition to wearable sensors, 
an increasing number of fertility apps have also become available such as Ovia 
Fertility or Glow, creating platforms for women to input data about their bodies, 
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again with a view to increasing their chances of becoming pregnant. Of course, 
sensors and apps work with the body in different ways. Whilst sensors record and 
detect changes in bodily fluids or temperature, with apps the user must input the data 
they have produced using their body as a measuring tool. However, both sensors and 
apps respond to, albeit different forms of, biological matter.  
 
These two different examples of biosensing systems share significant social and 
ethical dimensions. They both draw on narratives of enhanced visibility and self-
optimisation: knowing about your genetic risks brings enhanced responsibility and 
pressure for behaviour change; knowing your ovulation patterns implies enhanced 
control of fertility.  Both systems draw on ‘biologically active agents’ sampled at 
home but which then travel through sociotechnical networks involving laboratory and 
web spaces, in which they become transformed into data. In this way they come to 
frame the body as a ‘complex information network’ (Lupton 2012) and are both to a 
varying extent individualising, in the sense that they produce health/fertility as 
unconnected with wider conditions in society or with public policy. Outside of 
clinical control and commercially located, they are the subject of severe criticism 
from medical professionals on grounds of accuracy and effectiveness.  
 
Another recent development which exemplifies the social risks associated with 
proliferation and commercialisation of ‘digital health’ is the ‘care.data’ initiative 
(NHS England 2015) which indicates that personal health data (in the UK arising 
from the universal health service) is now regarded by government and some industry 
sectors as a strategic economic resource. Decades of accumulated health and medical 
data for the population in England and Wales is currently being re-packaged as a 
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globally unique platform for biomedical innovation. The care.data initiative has been 
particularly controversial since earlier in 2014 it was revealed that the Government’s 
Health and Social Care Information Centre had sold hospital records covering 47 
million citizens, identified by date of birth and postcode, to an insurance organisation 
(Telegraph 2014). So even if the NHS continues to be the primary repository for 
health data in the UK, it is clear that this data is beginning to circulate more widely. 
While not associated specifically with biosensors, the security of personal data was a 
key issue raised by the citizen’s panel. 
 
Comment 
Biosensing helps users to collect, store and assess personal health-related data. Many 
biosensors also facilitate the capture and storage of such data by commercial entities. 
Importantly, all of this labour occurs outside (although sometimes in tandem or 
conversation with) traditional biomedical networks (for example clinician's surgeries, 
public databases, hospitals), and outwith the regulatory processes associated with 
medical technologies. As increasing numbers of people buy and use these 
technologies, then, we need to consider the social, ethical and political costs of health 
monitoring and to think critically about how these technologies re-articulate and re-
make health, risk and society.  
 
Methodology 
The study we draw on in this article was part of a broader interdisciplinary and multi-
institutional, international research programme, ‘Biosensors in Everyday Life,’ 
supported by Intel’s University Research Office (2010-2013). In our part of this 
programme, we have conducted three interlinked projects under the title ‘Living 
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Data: making sense of biosensors’: a doctoral study on direct to consumer (DTC) 
genetic testing; a doctoral study on home fertility monitoring, and the citizens panel 
‘Our Bodies, Our Data’, we draw on in this article. 
 
As we have noted, much of the debate and analysis of biosensing focuses on its 
technical and scientific base.  Given the potential social effects of such technologies 
we felt that it was important to engage a broader spectrum of voices in developments 
in the biosciences and management of data where innovations were exposing the 
public to challenges such as the management of uncertainty and risk, and the 
extensive circulation of their personal data. We therefore organised a two-day event, 
‘Our Bodies, Our Data’, in which a carefully selected sample of citizens in 
Lancashire were invited to interrogate and debate complex issues arising from the 
introduction of direct-to-consumer genetic testing and fertility monitoring devices, 
matters which the public seldom gets chance to consider formally.  
 
We adopted the deliberative panel approach from the citizens’ jury model and drew 
on a now established tradition of participatory democratic practice (Coote and 
Lenaghan 1997; Harrison, Mort and Dowswell 1999; Kashefi and Mort 2004; 
Gooberman-Hill et al 2008).  An overview of methods and case studies in public 
engagement can be seen at the National Coordinating Centre for Public Engagement 
http://www.publicengagement.ac.uk/how.  If carefully conducted using transparent 
processes, it can provide opportunities for citizens who are not necessarily involved 
with, or users of, particular innovations, to learn about them, ask critical questions 
and respond thoughtfully to the social, ethical and technical questions they provoke. 
The approach enables the formation of public understandings and opinion to enter a 
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domain dominated by experts.  As such, it is a legitimate space within which to 
identify issues for debate and to offer recommendations to key actors involved in the 
development, marketing and regulation and consequences of those technologies. As a 
research method, citizens’ panels allow us to move beyond the experience of 
particular patient groups or interested actors to consider the views of a much broader 
group of respondents, who are both more implicated than they may have thought they 
were, but also potentially more able to consider a range of implications without 
referring to direct personal investment. As suggested above, speaking to citizens 
allows us to focus on the implications of biosensing for society as a whole, raising 
significant ethical, social and political questions about risk, responsibility, trust and 
accountability.  
 
We acknowledge that this approach has a number of limitations. While consultation 
is important, as Boaz et al (2014) argue, it does not equate with participation, and 
runs the risk of allowing ‘the research enterprise, health services and governance 
structures to continue largely with business as usual’.  Another important criticism 
centres on the timing of citizens’ engagement. If the engagement takes place 
‘downstream’ then citizens’ ability to influence policy or technological development 
is limited; if too far ‘upstream’ the process can be frustrating as there are few 
materialised examples to examine (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007). Additionally 
in our case, the panel took place in the North-West of England, a location that shaped 
the outcomes of the consultation in various ways. For example, the participants all 
clearly identified the National Health Service (NHS) as the primary and most trusted 
provider of health care and health information. It was widely taken for granted that 
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the NHS should also take care of biomedical and health data. This strongly reflects 
participants’ ‘history’ with publicly funded universal healthcare. 
 
The panel process 
The 15-member panel was recruited and organised independently by a consultant 
experienced in participatory methods, Dr Sue Weldon, to reflect a broad cross section 
of citizens, rather than a representative sample of society. Each participant was 
approached with information about the panel process and if interested, subsequently 
followed up with a formal informed consent process. Members were recruited, from 
within a local area of 40 miles, to selection criteria encompassing: gender (broadly 
equal numbers of men and women); age (from 18 to 75); a range of residency 
including urban and rural, private and social housing; a mix of occupation/education, 
and diversity in physical ability and ethnicity (see Table 1).  
 
—insert Table 1 here— 
 
We reimbursed participants’ travel expenses and paid them a small fee for their time 
and all were sent a copy of the draft report for comment. In contrast with 
ethnographic, interview or focus group based studies, which concentrate purposively 
on affected individuals or groups, these were citizens with no professional or vested 
interest in the technologies to be discussed. They did, however, bring a very wide 
variety of life experience and knowledge to the consultation. Interestingly it later 
emerged that all the panel participants had some connection, either direct or indirect, 
to the underlying issues brought up in the scenario or debate around biosensing and 
data, either from personal experience or through family members or friends. This 
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shows how ‘innovations’ which at first might seem distant from us are in fact 
embedded in everyday life. 
 
Insert Figure 1 The Scenario  
 
The ‘Our Bodies, Our Data’ examination of direct-to-consumer genetic testing and 
home reproductive technologies was initiated by through a scenario entitled the 
‘Brown Family from Preston’. This fictional family included 32-year-old Ben, who 
was concerned about his risk of Alzheimer’s Disease and was engaging with direct-
to-consumer genetic testing, and 36-year-old Louise who was trying to conceive and 
had purchased fertility monitoring devices.  Based on data from the two doctoral 
ethnographic studies, the scenario explored the reactions of family members to Ben 
and Louise’s engagement with biosensing, and introduced the practicalities of testing 
and receiving results. The scenarios articulated possible concerns, but were neither 
positive nor negative about biosensing.  
 
Scenarios are often used in futures planning or to develop policy where there are a 
number of possible outcomes. Scenarios are seen as helpful informative tools to work 
with imagined problems and important concerns. Features of systems can be explored 
in a variety of ways through the storyline, and can be supplemented by using 
examples of products, websites, and illustrative documents. The idea of using a 
family scenario in the ‘Our Bodies, Our Data’ inquiry was to present common 
features occurring between direct-to-consumer genetic testing and home reproductive 
technologies, allowing participants to reflect on the possible day-to-day implications 
of these, and to act as prompts for discussion and points of departure. The scenario 
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did not deliberately highlight any particular risks: in this article we focus on risk 
arises from the panel’s deliberations. 
 
‘Expert’ witnesses are frequently used in citizen panel projects to assist members in 
gaining an understanding of for example how new technical systems have developed, 
are supposed to work or what legal or ethical frameworks are relevant to their 
implementation. By responding to questions developed by groups of panel members, 
and addressing their concerns about the scenarios, the witnesses share their expertise 
with panel members. Through this discussion and form of questioning, the gap 
between lay and expert can be narrowed. The speakers we invited to ‘Our Bodies, 
Our Data’ panel discussion, provided input from four perspectives: primary health 
care; health research (specifically genetics); patient/user support groups (specifically 
infertility); NGO/third sector organisations (specifically genetics). The witnesses 
were: a General Practitioner and GP Tutor/ Primary Care medical educator with 
additional qualifications in sexual health, obstetrics and gynaecology, contraceptive 
techniques and paediatrics; the public programmes, manager at a centre for public 
engagement, education and training in biomedicine with a background in genetic 
counseling and science education; the chief executive of a national infertility charity 
dedicated to the support of those affected by infertility, and the director of a pressure 
campaigning group which specialises in the ethics, risks and social implications of 
human genetics. In the weeklong period between Day 1 and 2 the panel was invited 
to reflect on the expert witnesses’ responses. Finally, in small self-selected groups the 
panel developed a series of recommendations: for the biosensor industries; for 




Plenary and group discussions were audio recorded and transcribed and all material 
was anonymised. Analysis began in the final group session of the panel itself and is 
partly contained within the recommendations for change. Analysis by the authors in 
terms of theory generation was conducted later from multiple readings of the 
transcripts and fieldnotes. Below we have used text boxes for ‘collective quotes’ such 
as questions generated by small groups of panel members. Other extracts are taken 
from individual verbatim transcripts, although we have not attributed quotes to 
particular participants (who are listed in Table 1). We use participants’ words to show 
the views of the panel, not in order to trace any particular view back to a particular 
participant. In a citizen’s panel, members are always speaking within a collective 
setting, even if expressing personal views. In this article, we show how the citizen 
panel method produces different forms of data from other qualitative research, forms 
which include collectively developed questions, discussion summaries written on flip 
charts/post-it notes, fieldnotes and comments on draft reports, in addition to verbatim 
transcripts. Here, participants speak as citizens not as representatives of interest 
groups or as members of particularly affected populations: the aim is to explore 
questions relevant to all social groups.  
 
Insert Fig 2 Panel Discussion Running Notes 
 
The Lancaster University Research Ethics Committee provided approval for the 
associated doctoral studies of direct to consumer genetic testing and home 




Risks identified by the panel 
Asking questions about the technologies Day 1 of the panel meeting began with 
discussion of issues raised by the scenario; members were interested and concerned 
to learn that consumers could purchase a service that provided personal genetic 
information and future health predictions. They also raised questions about the 
accuracy and usefulness of the data produced in biosensing, and group questions 
focused on the regulation of biosensing systems.  The panel summarised these 
questions in the following way highlighting potential dangers, such as data security 
and test errors and the need for measures to enhance trust such as professional 
scrutiny and state regulation. 
 
Panel’s questions for the experts: on trust, reliability and regulation 
What measures are in place to keep the data secure? 
Is there any professional body to scrutinise these products/sites? 
Are these [fertility] products regulated in the UK? 
What is the quality of genetic tests? Are the results reliable?  
To what extent, for instance, can common conditions such as cancer be tested 
for? 
Can you tell that you are ovulating from saliva? Aren’t there better ways?  
Would you agree that 20,000 readings [of temperature, in relation to 
ovulation] creates an illusion of accuracy? 
How useful is the information to Ben really? 
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The panel members were particularly concerned about the relationship between the 
National Health Service and the commercial provision of tests/testing kits and several 
of the questions they articulated referred to the role of the NHS. 
 
 Panel’s questions for the experts: on relationships with clinicians 
What information (from web sites and tests) do people bring to their GP? 
How far should doctors interact with new commercial technologies? 
 
The panel members were very uneasy about commercial motivation of the companies 
providing the tests and problems this created for protecting the interests of those 
using the tests as was evident in the following questions: 
 
Panel’s questions for the experts: on commercialisation 
Who is going to benefit from the tests? 
Are there links between companies that offer tests and companies that sell 
drugs? 
Can employers/insurance companies have access to genetic data? 
 
The panel members were concerned about the need for consumer education and 
whether the companies providing the tests could be trusted as reflected in the 
following questions: 
 
Panel’s questions for the experts: on education and trust 
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Is there a need for better education? 
How do we know whether we can trust these companies? Is there a trusted 
website to make sense of other sites?  
 
They were also very concerned about the effects on the wider family of the longer-
term implications of accessing genetic information asking the following questions: 
 
Panel’s questions for the experts: on human costs 
How do you cope with the worry/concern for the whole family?  
How can people be supported to cope with the results?  
 
Formulating recommendations On Day 2, after small group discussion, panel 
members gathered in a plenary session in which they expressed a high level of 
concern about the commercial marketing of genetic tests and fertility devices. Some 
members of the panel questioned whether these were being designed to meet the 
needs of the consumer or to deliver returns for shareholders. They felt that a business 
model primarily motivated by profit, rather than one to provide public benefit, could 
lead to manipulation of markets to create more demand for (sometimes unnecessary 
or inappropriate) products fuelled by heightened public awareness of future risks of 
genetic conditions or infertility. One participant argued that: 
 
They (the companies) can set the agenda by creating fear and then, out of this 
fear, a demand for a service. 
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Many panel members reflected on current changes in the way health services were 
being provided in the UK and noted that the intrusion of commercial interests into 
their relationship with their General Practitioner and in some cases, patient support 
organisations, had the capacity to undermine their trust in them. ‘You trust them 
more if they are not trying to sell you something’, was a typical comment. 
 
Managing and containing uncertainty 
Panel members were very concerned with accountability, trust, standards and care of 
data. In the absence of specific regulation, the panel discussed the need to have some 
way of assessing the standard of products and services. One repeated suggestion was 
for a ‘kite mark’ or symbol to denote a safe product, endorsed by a trusted institution 
such as the NHS. Another concern was about personal data protection and fears were 
expressed that, once the data is supplied to a company (online), it would remain 
indefinitely available to be used in unknown ways.  
 
Trust The panel members agreed that a person’s trust in an organisation, company or 
product is critical. Trust is built out of knowledge (of the organisation, company or 
product) and often on the continuity of relationships. Panel members spoke about 
how trusting relationships could be established with doctors, health professionals or 
even with organisations through experience and over time. One woman expressed  
concern that digital communications erode that sense of relationship continuity. 
Many panel members felt that the NHS had always represented a standard of reliable 
healthcare as a ‘trusted organisation,’ with one participant stating:  
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I’d only really trust something that was sponsored by the National Health 
Service....because I think the NHS is a trusted organisation which is there to 
look after us. 
 
Panel members recognised that the NHS was undergoing significant structural change 
in the direction of privatisation and that this might affect future perceptions of trust.   
A relevant remark was: 
 
The only problem with that is that in the future, because of all the 
privatisation, there are going to be a lot of diverse companies involved in 
making a profit from the NHS and therefore who can we trust in the future? 
 
Accountability Panel members pointed out that accountability is an essential part of a 
trusting relationship, and rests on ability to hold individuals or organisations to 
account through a chain of responsibility. In this context one person referred to the 
2013 European ‘horse meat scandal’ in which supermarkets were selling meat 
products that were contaminated with horse meat (and other meats). The complexity 
of the meat supply chain meant that it was difficult to locate the source of 
contamination.  The panel members argued that people could only trust a system if 
they perceived those operating it ware committed to the general good rather than in 
pursuit of self interest.  One man argued, ‘With a doctor you can always go back if he 
(sic) misdiagnoses you. What happens if the test results are wrong?’ whilst another 
asked:  
What else does 23andME sell?....because how do we know they’ve got the 
specialists to do the tests? How do we know where the tests are going? 
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This concern was succinctly expressed by the question: ‘How many companies are in 
the chain?’ 
 
The panel members agreed that biosensor technology companies should formulate 
and publish a set of over-arching values and ethical guidelines. This recommendation 
arose out of concern that lack of regulation might lead to a fall in standards, 
particularly in respect of business practice and ethics. Panel members wanted to see 
written commitments to standards of good practice and argued that these guidelines 
should include an explicit commitment to develop new biosensor technologies for 
public benefit. ‘This would give you some basis for trusting them, and holding them 
accountable’, one participant stated.  
 
Panel members argued that companies should be transparent and accountable in 
dealings with the public.  They felt that the issue was particularly important when 
products were marketed online and there might be more than one company or 
organisation in the chain, obscuring responsibility for the quality, accuracy or safety:  
 
They need to be accountable about the way they are marketing as well as what 
they are marketing. So they need to be completely transparent about the 
product.... The people who vouch for it, so called experts.... So you want their 
name, their education, references to their work and so on.... 
 
Standards In the absence of regulation to protect the consumer, (when products and 
services were being marketed in other countries where regulation may be weaker or 
non-existent) panel members felt that it would be difficult to maintain how can 
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standards of quality and accuracy in the UK.   They expressed the desire to ‘see some 
qualifications’ of those offering a service and suggested:  
 
This comes back to the [idea about statutory] warning on the packet. You 
could make it mandatory to give a warning [that results may not be reliable]  
 
Minimal standards of accuracy were not high on the panel’s agenda; instead they 
were concerned that advertising claims made by bionsensor companies were 
regulated. 
 
Care of Data Panel members expressed concerns about the handling of personal data 
by companies that might use this data for further research without consent or pass it 
on to other companies selling treatments and drugs. They discussed the possibility 
that data might get into the wrong hands and such misuse of data might affect an 
individual’s insurance or employment status.   One member expressed this concern 
very strongly in terms of ‘stealing’: 
 
My feeling is that people who want to steal my information are more clever 
than I am. 
 
Panel members felt that biosensor companies should guarantee to treat personal data 
respectfully and safely, specifically in offering a choice of consent arrangements. 
They argued that personal data was a precious part of personal identity, where 
informed consent arrangements were vital. Transparency about what would happen to 
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personal data, and possible future use, would facilitate informed consent 
arrangements. Summarising group debate one participant explained: 
 
So for instance, before buying a service like a [genetic] test, right at the 
front there would be choices about what’s going to happen to your data, 
whether you consent to any use, some use, or perhaps no use of the data 
apart from sending the results back to you.  At the moment that’s not the 
case, you don’t know what they do with the data.  There should be 
guidelines that the company have set up for the use of this data, and they 
should be published as well as part of telling you what the service is. 
   
Panel members were also concerned about how data could be de-coupled from 
personal information in order to respect the anonymity of the consumer:  ‘It seems 
they all want us to be locked in, and that is a concern for a lot of people’. 
  
Provision of counseling and advice when considering the wider implications of 
biosensor test results, was called for. For instance, test results might suggest a need 
for further treatment, often with implications for other family members. It might be 
inappropriate for a company to offer counseling but there should be ‘up front advice’ 
to consult a doctor or a genetic counsellor before accessing these services along the 
lines of: ‘You should consult your doctor or, in the case of genetic tests, see a genetic 
counsellor’, as one man put it. 
 
Non-governmental support (including charities, patient support groups, disability 
groups) was needed to help users of biosensors understand and make sense of online 
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purchases, providing independent information and informal counselling. As one 
member suggested: 
 
….so if you did the 23andMe test and found that you had a condition....to 
have support networks in place to help you deal with that....[in the genetic 
testing scenario] Ben didn’t know what to do and 23andMe didn’t help....so 
someone to talk to about the information and provide support. 
 
The first and most useful role for non-governmental organisations would be to 
provide clear information about what tests, or biosensor services could offer and what 
they cannot offer. One woman argued that an important role would be in questioning 
some of the unrealistic claims being made by companies offering tests and biosensor 
devices: 
 
We want them to provide unbiased facts, or tell us what is missing. I would 
be looking for facts. What does this do? What does it offer? What are the 
problems? 
 
It was felt that users might need the guidance of an independent signposting service 
to direct users to specific support groups: ‘They are not going to know where to get 
this help’. 
 
Non-government organisations could provide a protected space, outside the 
professional services, for peer support offered by people who had similar experiences 
to share, in the view of the panel. In the scenario Ben was confused by the conflicting 
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advice he accessed from an online support group and, although it is normal practice 
to access such groups, there is little sense of who the forum discussants are, or of 
their motivations. Such spaces could be ‘infiltrated’ by companies seeking to promote 
products. Two essential elements of an authentic forum would be trust and 
reassurance:  ‘You want to speak to someone who has been in a similar situation’, 
said one member. 
 
The panel agreed that in the process of undergoing tests or using biosensor 
monitoring devices, there was a danger of being over-directed or ‘channelled’ in one 
direction towards further treatment, for instance with a course of drugs or IVF.  They 
agreed that was a role for patient support groups in providing alternative options so 
that users would be enabled to make choices. One member said: 
 
[It’s about] groups recognising the needs and desires behind decisions 
people make to have these tests done....particularly we were talking about 
their ... need to have or want a child .....so if these groups also acknowledge 
that need, and recognise that need and perhaps offer alternatives or the 
support around that need, then perhaps that would give a more balanced 
experience … 
 
There was a role for patient or user organisations in offering education about internet 
safety as an ‘antidote’ to industry promotion, advertising and unrealistic claims. The 
panel recognised that advertising could be a powerful way of offering hope, but they 
noted that it was important to provide a warning and some guidance – particularly for 
children. A young woman summarised this view in the following way: 
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We don’t accept anymore our limitations. That you can’t always improve on 
a situation. People will want to have something because they see it 
advertised...children...don’t learn how to deal with advertising messages and 
images. 
 
Discussion in the panel centered on the future relationship between commercial 
interests and the NHS in respect of ‘buying in’ services from both public and private 
providers. Initially, there was much panel debate about how the NHS could take a 
pro-active role in setting up a self-funded unit to supply data services (in competition 
with US companies such as 23andMe). Panel members suggested that by building on 
the ready availability of health data, these services could be used to extend population 
screening (for such things as breast and bowel cancer) by including genetic 
information. They suggested that the NHS could then raise much needed revenue by 
selling services to organisations such as pension groups. However, members also 
reflected on the dangers of selling information, either to individuals, public bodies 
(for research) or to organisations. One woman pointed out: 
 
As a principle, it’s your body, your data. It belongs to you. If you want 
information it should be available (to you) free of charge. 
 
The panel argued that safeguarding personal information and explaining how 
adequate levels of protection would be maintained could be done through consent 
arrangements. They suggested that the choice to ‘opt in’ rather than ‘opt out’ of data 
storage was a safer option. Serious reservations were expressed about the sharing of 
data records, when such data had been collected from different sources such as 
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screening, health records and numerous other sources such as bone marrow donors. It 
was felt that such anonymised data could be linked to patient records.  One member 
stated:  
 
It’s all about trusting them to look after your data. Don’t lose the 
opportunity to safeguard this [data]. 
 
The panel stressed the need for a greater awareness of ‘skilling up’ to meet future 
demands for professional and public information in the area of biosensing. It noted 
that professional advice and counselling would be vital in understanding what test 
results mean for individuals and, for the wider public, but there was doubt that most 
health professionals had the skills to address public concerns about the social and 
ethical issues and identified the need for training programmes for clinicians in 
offering information, support and counselling (where necessary). The panel also 
identified the need for public information (written in lay terms) in primary care 
centres, schools and public places inviting people to learn more about biosensors 
such as genetic tests and fertility monitors and what they could offer. The panel 
wanted a trusted body to act as ‘watchdog’ in determining which companies are 
offering reliable information, and to direct people to reliable testing companies. A 
vetting/monitoring service might determine which websites to trust how to make 
sense of claims.  
 
Discussion 
‘Our Bodies, Our Data’ was an attempt to move consideration of digital health 
technologies - specifically the design, development and provision of two kinds of 
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biosensors - from the domain of experts to that of citizens. While some of the views 
expressed by panel members resonated with those criticisms made by professionals 
and the third sector (as exemplified above by the Royal College of General 
Practitioners and the Alzheimer’s Society), members also raised wider concerns. 
These included trust and accountability; effect on family relationships; regulation, 
standards and scrutiny; expertise and training; data security; exploitation of anxious 
or vulnerable people; commodification of the body; support and counselling; 
provision of alternatives and maintenance of publicly funded services.  
 
The introduction and evaluation of biosensors to date has been dominated by 
individualising manufacturer and user accounts of self-optimisation and 
responsibilisation. Other researchers (Novas and Rose 2000; Rabinow 1999) have 
shown that genetic discourses do not necessarily individualise (‘geneticise’), but can 
lead affected individuals to identify as members of biosocial groups such as patient 
organisations. Whilst existing studies, including our own ethnographic accounts, 
highlight both the surveillance possibilities and the biosociality implied in much 
biosensing (pointing to their entwinement with online discussion forums, for 
example) (Saukko 2004; Nafus in Press), Our Bodies, Our Data engaged with people 
as citizens rather than as members of an embodied interest group. This engagement 
necessarily focused on more collective social and policy related concerns, facilitating 
the articulation of technology’s multiple stories and places and the reimagining of 
what biosensors might do and mean.  
 
As in existing work on health and risk, questions of relationally were important in our 
study; people expressed high levels of concern about interpersonal relations. 
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However, they also noted the importance of individuals’ actions for others in their 
communities and indeed for society more broadly. They were concerned, in other 
words, not only with the ways in which health risks were (or were not) being 
addressed by biosensing, but with the new social risks associated with personal health 
monitoring. Members discussed the potential for high levels of anxiety driven by 
proliferation of information as an increasing risk in contemporary life; debated the 
importance of trust-building; and displayed skepticism about expert knowledge,  
recognising the need for interpretation of numbers and demonstrating awareness of 
recent scandals they saw as relevant such as ‘care.data’ and horse meat. Not only did 
the panel members explicitly discuss the relevance of the horse meat scandal for 
biosensing, their discussion raised issues that were also those highlighted by Regan et 
al (2015) in their analysis of the horse meat scandal, who argued that holding 
individuals and organisations to account would be vital for the rebuilding of trust. 
The citizen panel approach, in other words, elucidated the social effects of attempts to 
know and manage future risk through biosensing. 
 
The panel’s responses to the dilemmas in the scenarios were informed by the 
members’ multiple embedded perspectives. As such they hold forms of credibility 
and legitimacy, different from both expert and stakeholders’ views. Their 
recommendations emanate also from a wariness of exploitation and also a concern for 
social solidarity which is missing from the discourse of the biosensor industry, where 
benefits are framed in the case of direct to consumer genetic testing at an individual 
risk level, or in the case of home ovulation monitoring at the level of the couple-as-
unit. The panel reflected concern for what kind of society is being made when genetic 
33 
testing and home reproductive biosensors are promoted and sold to members of the 
public online or in pharmacies outside of any clinical relationship or service.  
 
Conclusion 
Although sometimes invited to participate in research as members of specific affected 
groups, individuals rarely gain opportunities to debate and express concerns about 
socio-technical change as citizens. Speaking as a group formed only for the purpose 
of this research, the panel clearly identified a range of individual, familial and social 
risks involved in health biosensing developing specific recommendations for 
governments, technology companies and non-governmental organisations. 
Significantly, they strongly pressed for governmental regulation of biosensing 
technologies and for informed (NGO and governmental) oversight and care around 
the promises made and the data produced through these devices. In the ideal society 
articulated by this panel, biosensing would not remain in a commercial realm 
populated by keen users and profit-oriented developers, but would be part of a more 
thoughtful and cautious intersection between state health systems, health activism 
and responsible innovation. Whilst this finding could be described as idealistic, we 
argue that it articulates a politically, socially and ethically important desire for a 
different materialization of health, risk and society. 
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Table 1 The Panel 
 
Name Age From Occupation Interests 
Steve 37 Preston Charity Worker Football coach 
Mary 61 Lancaster Caterer Writing and 
performing 
Comment [1]: these are all 
pseudonyms and id is protected 
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Peter 61 Birmingham Carer Health and 
social care 
Stan 45 Morecambe Unemployed Volunteering 





Carol 18 Morecambe Casual work Volunteering 




Laura 71 Germany Retired teacher Languages 
Debbie 42 Heysham Carer Volunteering 
with children 
Maura 24 Holme Office worker First responder 
Rhona 28 Bare Student Body 
movement and 
health 
Callum 19 Preston Volunteer Astronomy/star 
gazing 
















The Scenario: the Browns from Preston 
Theresa, Grandmother died at 75 with Alzheimer’s Disease 
John, 65, Theresa’s son, becoming forgetful 
Cath, 60, John’s wife, concerned about her husband and son 
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Ben, 32, John and Cath’s son, single, uses genetic testing kit from 23andMe, found to 
be ‘increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease’ 
Louise, 36, John and Cath’s daughter, married, infertility issues, uses ovulation 
microscope 
Yusef, 30, Louise’s husband, infertility issues. 
Part 1: Making sense of genetic data 
Ben, aged 32, is a single man with a good job working in a small engineering 
company. He likes computers and his smart-phone, and enjoys downloading films 
and surfing the web. One of his favourite websites recently is called 23andMe. This is 
a company based in the US that sells genetic testing kits directly to the public. A 
friend at work had read about 23andMe in the magazine Wired and mentioned it over 
lunch one day. He had been quite excited about it…… Read more at 
https://biosensordata.wordpress.com/2015/10/ 
           
  







Figure 2 Panel Discussion Running Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
